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This Paper seeks to examine the theoretical underpinnings, as discovered or constructed by the Supreme Court of Indiain 
the last 70 years, as to „why‟ of two distinct copyrights envisaged by The Copyright Act, 1957 and The Designs Act, 2000. 
An analysis ofdecisions of the Supreme Court reveals that: (i) in none of the cases validity of either of two copyrights was 
challenged; (ii) both Labour and Utilitarian Theories, and not any other theory, have been simultaneously used to justify 
„why‟ of two distinct copyrights; (iii) inherent differences between these theoretical frameworks have been neglected; 
(iv) deployment of these two theories appear to be more mechanical than reasoned for logic of tangible subject matter has
been unhesitatingly extended to intangible subject matter of two copyrights; and (v) judicial ratiocination does not transcend
Labour-Utilitarian Framework except in one judicial opinion which highlights the Un-Indian features of Copyright Law but
exercises judicial restraints to invoke it. It has been argued once thatthese theories were invoked, it had been expected that
the Court would apply judicial standards to rigorously scrutinize theoretical underpinning of two copyrights from all
possible angles. Decisions of the Supreme Court nonetheless provide an insight into theoretical underpinnings of two
copyrights.
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Theory, Supreme Court of India, Copyright, Design, Intellectual Property, Labour Theory, IP Statutes 
Literature on theoretical underpinnings of copyright 
under The Copyright Act, 1957,
1
 and copyright under 
The Designs Act, 2000,
2
 as discovered or constructed 
by the Supreme Court of India (Supreme Court) is 
conspicuous by absence.
3
 These statutory rights shall 
be referred to as „two copyrights‟ in this paper.An 
analysis of theoretical underpinnings of these two 
copyrights is necessary to appreciate the bases and 
reasons thereof to strengthen the respect for and 
effective enforcement of these exclusionary rights. 
Theories provide a framework for meaningful 
engagement in the debate relating to the subject 
matter under study. Knowledge of theoretical 
framework helps identify and question the 
assumptions thereof and the validity of logical 
arguments flowing from there. An analysis without 
theoretical framework is unguided, rootless and 
infertile. 
The Court generally weaves theories around the 
naked provisions of Statutes to ratiocinate and build 
justification. Ratiocination is the hallmark of judicial 
process in the common law system. It helps promote 
realization of non-negotiable values of fairness, 
reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. Ratiocination 
brings about certainty, calculability, and predictability 
and helps people respect, accept, plan and organize 
their affairs within the framework of law. The 
Supreme Court is not expected to invoke or build a 
theoretical framework to justify its decisions. Judicial 
reasoning is a process much rigorous than mere 
theorization. Judicial reasoning is a persistent quest 
for search of a ground that cannot be further 
grounded. A ground which is both theoretical and 
practical.A ground which is both efficient and just. 
Judicial search for such a ground is necessitated for 
balancing the competing interests of the right holders, 
competitors and society at large. These competing 
interests define the contours of discourse on 
intellectual property rights (IP) in general and of the 
two rights in particular. 
It is generally accepted that knowledge should be 
publicijuris necessary for human flourishing and 
development of society. IP is considered to be 
aneffective and necessary device to encourage 
creation of new knowledge. Idea of “exclusivity” is 








knowledge without the authorization of right holder. 
Exclusivity, therefore, does not fit within the scheme 
of publici juris. 
IP is a negative-private property to exclude or 
prevent others. IP is not a positive right. For Socialists 
and Communists, private property is bad. IP is also a 
monopoly to exclude others. Monopoly is considered 
an evil not only in socialists‟ economies, but also in 
capitalist systems. Competition is the soul of a 
capitalist economy. Monopoly is antithetical to 
competition. At Common Law, however, competition 
and monopoly were born together. The Statute of 
Monopolies, 1623 enacted in England sought to curb 
monopolies but recognized grant of patents for 
inventions as an exception to competition. It is 
believed that the monopoly in the form of IP is in 
furtherance to competition, i.e., the monopoly in the 
form IP promotes rather than stifling competition by 
enforcing exclusive rights to encourage creativity. 
The Competition Act, 2002
4
 enacted by the 
Parliament of India also recognizes IP as an 
exception.
5
The question, therefore, is why law makes 
monopoly enforceable in the form of IP? A related 
question is whether rationalization is enough to justify 
an evil?  These questions are perennial and persistent 
and have not been answered in a way which can 
convince everyone. Contest between the models of 
property regime is also continuous. Neither capitalist 
model, nor socialist model, nor communist model has 
been able to provide a just and fair compromise 
between the public and the private. IP is a dominant 
attribute of capitalist model. Therefore, it has all the 
strengths and weaknesses of the capitalism. Although, 
the Preamble to the Constitution of India declares 
India to be „Socialist‟ yet since the year 1991 India is 
fast tracking on the path of capitalism. Private 
property in general and the IP in particular is an 
essential feature of capitalism. Inclusion of IP in the 
Agreement establishing World Trade Organization 
1994
6
 added unprecedented value to trade in IP and 
this inclusion also brought about significant increase 
in the number of litigations relating to IP not only in 
India but also in other countries. 
IP Law, like most of other Indian laws, is a colonial 
legacy. The genesis of IP Law in India may be traced 
to the time of Transfer of Power from the East India 
Company to the British Crown in the year 1858 AD. 
For the first time, British Statutes relating to patents 
were extended to India. The first IP Statute that 
British Parliament enacted for India was the Patents 
and Designs Act, 1911,
7
 and the second Statute was 
the Indian Copyright Act, 1914.
8
 During the British 
Raj there was no specific Statute relating to 
trademarks. Trademarks were registered under the 
Registration Act, 1940. Only three IP, namely: (i) 
patents (ii) designs and (iii) copyright were statutorily 
recognized before the Independence of India. Trade 
secret was and is recognized by Indian common law. 
Perhaps this is the reason why entry 49 of List I of 
Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India 
recognizes only “Patents, Copyright and Trademark”. 
Interestingly all the seven IP Statutes for the time 
being in force in India are post-Independence 





 (ii) The Patents Act, 1970,
10 
& The Patents Rules, 2003,
11
 (iii) The Trade Marks 
Act, 1999,
12 
& The Trade Marks Rules, 2002,
13
 (iv) 
The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration 
and Protection) Act, 1999,
14 
&The Geographical 
Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) 
Rules, 2002,
15





 (vi) The Semiconductor 
Integrated Circuits Layout-Design Act, 2000,
17 
&The 
Semiconductor Integrated Circuits Layout-Design 
Rules, 2001,
18
 and (vii) The Protection of Plant 
Varieties and Farmers‟ Rights Act, 2001,
19 
& The 




In addition to the aforementioned seven Statutes, 
some provisions relating to IP have been made in the 
Biological Diversity Act, 2002,
21 
and the Biological 
Diversity Rules, 2004.
22
 There is a draft known as 
[Draft] National Innovation Act, 2008,
23
 which seeks 
to promote innovation and provide mechanism for the 
protection of confidential information (trade secret). 
In all, there are eight types of IP in India. Out of these 
eight rights, seven of them have been legislated upon 
by the Parliament of India through the aforementioned 
seven Statutes. Trade secret is an IP recognized by 
courts in India
24
 but is not legislated upon. 
Since IP rights are having statutory and common 
law sanctions, the bar of justification of these rights is 
not very high. However, the fact that these rights are 
species of private monopoly property rights raises the 
bar of their justification. In other words, unlike right 
to equality, and right to freedom of speech and 
expression, IP does not enjoy the ready acceptance 
and respect from the public and this fact raises the bar 
of its justification. Socialists and communists readily 
reject the idea of private property including IP. 




Generally, the justification of private property 
including IP is taken for granted. 
No decision of the Supreme Court is available in 
which the constitutional validity of any type of IP has 
been raised. Since there is a very strong presumption 
of constitutionality of a Statute, the burden of proving 
the unconstitutionality of any of the IP is very high 
for seven out of eight IP which are having statutory 
backing.   
Theoretical underpinning of decisions on IP by the 
Supreme Court is based on English Philosophy 
developed by John Locke and Jeremy Bentham. There 
are only few Supreme Court decisions on two 
copyrights in comparison to the number decisions 
relating to other types of IP.
25
 Maximum number of 
judgments is on trademark, then on patents, then on 
copyright, and then on designs. No decision of the 
Supreme Court is available on geographical 
indications, semiconductor integrated circuits, and 
protection of plant variety. There are decisions of the 
Supreme Court on trade secret. These decisions, 
however, relate to the interpretation of the provisions 
of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
26
 
relating to employment contracts. No decision of the 
Supreme Court is available for the explicit proposition 
that trade secret is an IP. 
During the research, it has been found that all the 
decisions relating to two copyrights do not identify 
theoretical underpinnings thereof.  
Although the Supreme Court has deployed only 
Labour and Utilitarian theories, yet the Paper refers to 
other theoretical frameworks
27
 to explain, justify or 
question IP.Thepaper seeks to identify, describe and 
generalize about the theoretical underpinnings of the 
decisions of the Supreme Court so far it relates to 
„why‟ of two distinct copyrights envisaged by the two 
statutes — and aims to fill some void in IP literature 
particularly relating to theoretical frameworks of the 
two statutes.  
 
Copyright under The Copyright Act, 1957: 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
A total of six Supreme Court decisions invoke the 
theoretical framework to justify „why‟ of copyright 
under The Copyright Act, 1957. 
First decision is Indian Performing Right Society 
Ltd v Eastern India Motion Pictures Association.
28 
Lead opinion was delivered by Justice Jaswant Singh 
by use of harmonious construction to avoid the 
seeming conflict between the provisions of The 
Copyright Act, 1957, (Copyright Act). Lead opinion 
did not delve into the theoretical underpinnings of 
copyright. The separate but concurring opinion by 
Justice Krishna Iyer raised the fundamental questions 
about copyright law „solely to belight a slightly 
penumbral area of the law and to voice a need for 
legislative exploration to protect a category now left 
in the cold.‟ This penumbral area of law was 
described by him „in a cosmic perspective‟ as „a thing 
of beauty has no boundary and is humanity‟s property 
but in the materialist plane on which artists thrive, 
private and exclusive estate in art subsists.‟
29
 He 
reasoned that „Man, the noblest work of the Infinite 
Artist, strangely enough, battles for the finite products 
of his art and the secular law, operating on the 
temporal level, guardian‟s material works possessing 
spiritual values. The enigmatic smile of Mona Lisa is 
the timeless heritage of mankind but, till liberated by 
the prescribed passage of time, the private copyright 
of the human maker says, “hands off”.
29 
Highlighting 
the locus of creative mind in economic system, he 
observed as:  
„The creative intelligence of man is displayed in 
multiform ways of aesthetic expression but it 
often happens thateconomicsystems so operate 
that the priceless divinity which we call artistic 
or literary creativity in man is exploited and 
masters, whose works are invaluable, are 
victims of piffling payments‟.
29
(emphasis added) 
Focusing on coexistence of twin rights in musical 
work and cinematograph films, Justice Krishna Iyer 
notes as: 
„Our copyright statute protects the composite 
cinematograph work produced by lay-out of 
heavy money and many talents but does not 
extinguish the copyrightable component parts 
into. The music which has merged, through the 
sound track, into the motion picture, is 
copyrighted by the producer but, on account of 
this monopoly, the music composer‟s copyright 
does not perish. The twin rights can coexist, 
each fulfilling itself in its delectable 
distinctiveness. Section 14 has, in its careful 
arrangement of the rights belonging to each 
copyright, has a certain melody and harmony to 
miss which is to lose the sense of the Scheme.‟
30
 
Justice Krishna Iyer was the only judge to notice 
and explain the un-Indian feature of the Copyright 
Law in the following words: 




„A somewhat un-Indian feature we noticed in the 
Indian Copyright Act falls to be mentioned. Of 
course, when our law is intellectual „borrowing 




In his inimitable style, Justice Krishna Iyer 
described the essence of music in musical words as 
under:  
„Therefore, copyrighted music is not the soulful 
tune, the superb singing, the glorious voice or 
the wonderful rendering. It is the melody or 
harmony reduced to print, writing or graphic 
form. The Indian music lovers‟ throng to listen 
and be enthralled or enchanted by the nada 
brahma, the sweet concord of sounds, the rags, 




Highlighting the requirement of fixation or 
reification of music on a tangible medium, Justice 
Iyer wrote as follows: 
„Printed music is not the glamour or glory of it, 
by and large, although the content of the poem 
or the lyric or the song does have appeal. 
Strangely enough, „author‟, as defined in 
Section 2(d),
31
 in relation to a musical work, is 
only the composer and Section 16 confines 
„copyright‟ to those works which are recognized 
by the Act. This means that the composer alone 
has copyright in a musical work. The singer has 
none. This disentitlement of the musician or 
group of musical artists to copyright is un-
Indian, because the major attraction which lends 
monetary value to a musical performance is not 
the music maker, so much as the musician. 




He offered a suggestion to the Parliament to belight 
the penumbral area of copyright law in the following 
words: 
„I make this observation only because Act in one 
sense, depends on the ethos and the aesthetic 
best of a people; and while universal protection 
of intellectual and aesthetic property of creators 
of „works‟ is an international obligation, each 
country in its law must protect such rights 
wherever originality is contributed. So viewed, 
apart from the music composer, the singer must 
be conferred a right. Of course, lawmaking is 
the province of Parliament but the Court must 
communicate to the lawmaker such infirmities as 
exist in the law extant.‟
32
 
The chasms of Copyright Law as recognized by 
Justice Krishna Iyer may be formulated as the chasms 
between: (i) the spiritual and the material, (ii) the 
humanity‟s property and private property, (iii) the 
creator and the master (capitalist) (iv) the colonial 
legacy and Indian values, (v) the meaning of “musical 
work” in the copyright law sense and the meaning of 
music in the Indian sense, (vi) the maker (composer) 
of music and the singer, musician or group of musical 
artists, (vii) the international obligation and demands 
of originality, and (viii) the enacted law and her 
infirmities.  
Justice Krishna Iyer did not look for support in the 
extant theories of IP. He also did not provide the 
solution to the problem. Rather he communicated the 
problem to the Parliament for appropriate solution. 
Had the constitutionality of The Copyright Act been 
challenged, perhaps Justice Krishna Iyer instead of 
adding a „footnote‟ and „in a sense otiose‟ would have 
either dissented or applied his theoretical approach to 
the facts of the case and would not have exercised 
judicial restraint. His opinion in his own words is 
otiose because it does not have any bearing 
whatsoever on concrete judgment. Nevertheless, his 
opinion is the North Star in the sense of identifying 
the infirmities of copyright law. His observation 
„Each country in its law must protect such rights 
wherever originality is contributed. So viewed, apart 
from the music composer, the singer must be 
conferred a right‟
32
 places the highest premium on 
originality, originality as the determiner of protection. 
In other words, it is the originality which brings the 
copyright protection at the central stage. It may be 
said that by treating originality Justice Krishna Iyer is 
invoking the theories of Locke and Hegel. No 
observation made in this case can be extended to 
invoking the Utilitarian or Social Planning Theory.  
In the most celebrated Full Bench decision in RG 
Anandv Delux Films,
33
 Justice MurtazaFazal Ali 
delivered the lead opinion. Justice Jaswant Singh 
delivered a separate but concurring opinion in full 
agreement with Justice MurtazaFazal Ali. Justice R S 
Pathak delivered a separate and concurring opinion. 
He would have perhaps dissented but for a concurrent 
finding of facts by both the Courts below. As to the 
theoretical underpinnings of copyright law, Justice 
Fazal Ali noted that the case was of first impression 
and observed as under: 




„[I]t seems. . .that the fundamental idea of 
violation of copyright imitation is the violation 
of the Eighth Commandment: “Thou shall not 
steal” which forms the moral basis of the 
protective provisions of The Copyright Act of 
1911. It is obvious that when a writer or a 
dramatist produces a drama it is a result of his 
great labour, energy, time and ability and if any 
other person is allowed to appropriate the 
labours of the copyrighted work, his act amounts 
to theft by depriving the original owner of the 
copyright of the product of his labour.‟
34
 
The aforesaid observation clearly invokes Labour 
Theory. He further observed that „When an idea is 
given embodiment in a tangible form, it becomes the 
subject of common-law property rights which are 
protected by the courts, at least when it can be said to 
be novel and new.
‟35
 
Use of the word “novel” and “new” by the Court 
deviates from the well-established principle of 
originality under copyright law. Court should have 
been careful in choosing the vocabulary. Novelty or 
newness is a requirement under patent law. Further, 
not every embodiment of an idea into a tangible form 
rise to the dignity of originality. Furthermore, 
copyright is not merely a common law right but is a 
statutory right under Section 16 of The Copyright Act.  
Lead opinion invokes the Labour Theory in the 
following words: 
„Nevertheless, it is the unfair appropriation of 
the labour of the author whose work has been 
infringed that constitutes legal infringement.
‟36
 
Identifying the protectable subject matter under the 
Copyright Law, the Court observed as: 
„Thus, the position appears to be that an idea, 
principle, theme, or subject matter or historical 
or legendary facts being common property 
cannot be the subject matter of copyright of a 
particular person. It is always open to any 
person to choose an idea as a subject matter and 
develop it in his own manner and give 
expression to the idea by treating it differently 
from others. Where two writers write on the 
same subject similarities are bound to occur 
because the central idea of both are the same 
but the similarities or coincidences by 
themselves cannot lead to an irresistible 
inference of plagiarism or piracy. Take for 
instance the great poet and dramatist 
Shakespeare most of whose plays are based on 
Greek-Roman and British mythology or 
legendary stories like Merchant of Venice, 
Hamlet, Romeo Juliet, Julius Caesar etc. But the 
treatment of the subject by Shakespeare in each 
of his dramas is so fresh, so different, so full of 
poetic exuberance, elegance and erudition and 
so novel in character as a result of which the 
end product becomes an original in itself. In 
fact, the power and passion of his expression, 
the uniqueness, eloquence and excellence of his 
style and pathos and bathos of the dramas 
become peculiar to Shakespeare and leaves 
precious little of the original theme adopted by 
him. It will thus be preposterous to level a 
charge of plagiarism against the great 
playwright. In fact, throughout his original 
thinking, ability and incessant labour 
Shakespeare has converted an old idea into a 
new one, so that each of the dramas constitutes 
a masterpiece of English literature. It has been 
rightly said that “every drama of Shakespeare is 
an extended metaphor”. Thus, the fundamental 
fact which has to be determined where a charge 
of violation of the copyright is made by the 
plaintiff against the defendant is to determine 
whether or not the defendant not only adopted 
the idea of the copyrighted work but has also 
adopted the manner, arrangement, situation to 
situation, scene to scene with minor changes or 
super additions or embellishment here and 
there. Indeed, if on a perusal of the copyrighted 
work the defendant‟s work appears to be a 
transparent rephrasing or a copy of a 
substantial and material part of the original, the 
charge of plagiarism must stand proved. Care 
however must be taken to see whether the 
defendant has merely disguised piracy or has 
actually reproduced the original in a different 
form, different tone, different tenor so as to 
infuse a new life into the idea of the copyrighted 
work adapted by him. In the latter case, there is 
no violation of the copyright.‟
37
 
The lead opinion declares that one who produces a 
work in the copyright law sense, deserves that the 
fruit of his labour receives legal protection.  
Justice Pathak observed that „[I]t is always 
possible for a person intending to take 
advantage of the intellectual effort and labours 
of another to so develop his own product that it 




covers a wider field than the area included 
within the scope of the earlier product, and in 
the common area covered by the two 
productions to introduce changes in order to 
disguise the attempt at plagiarism.
‟38
 
The Supreme Court in RG Anand
39
explicitly talked 
about “great labour, energy, time and ability and if 
any other person is allowed to appropriate the labours 
of the copyrighted work, his act amounts to theft by 
depriving the original owner of the copyright of the 
product of his labour.” This is an explicit recognition 
of Labour Theory of IP. The Supreme Court is not 
saying that the work is the extension of the 
personality of the author, or copyright serves a social 
purpose, or copyright is a thing of social utility, or 
copyright is an instrument of social planning. The 
Court has declared “Thou shall not steal” as the 
“moral basis of the protective provisions of” the 
Copyright Law. Invoking the natural right  
approach for justification of copyright law can  
hardly minimize the chasm between the friends and 
foes of copyright law.  
In Gramophone Company of India Ltd v 
BirendraBahadur Pandey,
40
Justice O Chinnappa 
Reddy delivered the judgment on behalf of the 
unanimous Court. The opinion relating to theoretical 
underpinning is identified as under: 
„An artistic, literary or musical work is the 
brainchild of its author, the fruit of his labour and 
so considered to be his property. So highly is it 
prized by all civilized nations that it is thought 
worthy of protection by national laws and 
international Conventions relating to Copyright.‟
41
 
It seems that the Supreme Court in this case 
invoked the Labour Theory of property by making the 
above observation that an artistic, literary or musical 
work is the brainchild of its author, the fruit of his 
labour and so considered to be his property. 
In State of AP v Nagoti Venkataramana,
42 
the 
Supreme Court started to reason from the Statement 
of Objects and Reasons to Amendment
43
 to The 
Copyright Act which reads as „Piracy has become a 
global problem due to the rapid advances in 
technology. It has assumed alarming proportions all 
over the world and all the countries are trying to meet 
the challenge by taking stringent legislative and 
enforcement measures. The problem of piracy and the 
necessity for taking sufficient anti-piracy measures 
were also voiced by Members of Parliament at the 
time of the consideration of the Bill to amend The 
Copyright Act.‟
44
 Discussing the problem generated 
by copyright piracy (infringement), the Supreme 
Court observed as under:  
„Mainly there are three types of piracy, namely, 
piracy of the printed word, piracy of sound 
recordings and piracy of cinematograph films. 
The object of the pirate in all such cases is to 
make quick money and avoid payment of 
legitimate levies and royalties. In respect of 
books, it is estimated that four hundred to five 
hundred titles are pirated every year in India 
and on each of the pirated titles, the loss to the 
Government in the form of tax evasion amounts 
approximately to Rs 11,000. Apart from books, 
recorded music and video cassettes of films and 
TV programs are reproduced, distributed and 
sold on a massive scale in many parts of the 
world without any remuneration to the authors, 
artists, publishers and producers concerned. 
The emergence of new techniques of recordings, 
fixation and reproduction of audio programs, 
combined with the advent of video technology 
have greatly helped the pirates. It is estimated 
that the losses to the film producers and other 
owners of copyright amount to several crores of 
rupees. The loss to Government in terms of tax 
evasion also amounts to crores of rupees. In 
addition, because of the recent video boom in 
the country, there are reports that uncertified 
video films are being exhibited on a large scale. 
A large number of video parlors have also 
sprung up all over the country and they exhibit 
such films recorded on video tapes by charging 
admission fees from their clients. In view of 
these circumstances, it is proposed to amend 
The Copyright Act suitably to combat effectively 
the piracy that is prevalent in the country.‟
45
 
The basic reason underlying the approach of the 
Supreme Court in Nagoti Venkataramana,
42
 seems to 
be loss of revenue to the State, i.e., pirated copies of 
the copyrighted materials help promote the problem 
of tax evasion. In other words, lost revenue is a loss to 
the public at large for functions of the State including 
the welfare functions cannot be adequately discharged 
without collection of taxes. Protecting copyright, 
therefore, not only protects the interests of the owner 
of copyright but it also generates revenue for the 
State. This approach of the Supreme Court is purely 
Utilitarian, i.e., protection of copyright is in the 
interest of the State and the public at large. 




In Gramophone Co of India Ltd v Mars Recording 
Pvt Ltd,
46
the unanimous decision on behalf of the 
Court was delivered by Justice RajendraBabu. In this 
case, no opinion as to the theoretical basis of 
copyright was expressed. Perhaps, had the case been 
decided on merit by the Supreme Court, there would 
have been some opinion in this regard. The same 
remained the position of the Supreme Court in Exphar 
SA v Eupharma Laboratories Ltd
47
and Dhodha House 
v S K Maingi.
48
 
In Entertainment Network (India) Ltd vSuper 
Cassette Industries Ltd,
49 
the judgement on behalf of 
the unanimous Court was delivered by Justice S B 
Sinha.As to the theoretical underpinning of copyright, 
the relevant observation of the Supreme Court is 
reproduced as:  
„There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that an 
artistic, literary or musical work is the 
brainchild of an author, the fruit of his labour 
and, so, considered to be his property. A 
copyright, however, unlike a trade mark is a 
right created under the Act as is evident from 
Section 16 thereof. When an author of a 
copyright and other claims a copyright, it is 
subjected to the provisions of the Act. The rights 
and obligations of the author ought to be found 
out within the four corners of the Act. It is not 
necessary to dilate more upon these aspects of 
the matter as the object behind enacting the Act 
is absolutely clear and explicit. It creates a 
monopoly in favor of the author. Copyright also 
creates a monopoly in favor of the copyright 
society. What requires protection is unlawful 
reproduction of the author‟s work by others. It is 
the long period which encourages the authors to 
create works of literature, music and art.‟
50
 
The Supreme Court cited the observation of the 
Court in Gramophone Company of India Ltd
51
 and 
further cited from Copinger and Skone James on 
Copyright
52
 that  
„Finally, it is considered a social requirement in 
the public interest that authors and other rights 
owners should be encouraged to publish their 
work so as to permit the widest possible 
dissemination of works to the public at large. 
These four fundamental principles are 
cumulative and interdependent and are applied 
in the justification of copyright in all countries, 
although different countries give varying 
emphasis to each of them. To generalize, it is 
true to say that in the development of modern 
copyright laws, the economic and social 
arguments are given more weight in Anglo-
American laws of common law tradition, 
whereas, in Continental law countries with civil 
law systems, the natural law argument and the 
protection of authors are given first place.‟
53
. . . 
.„The protection of copyright, along with other 
IP, is considered as a form of property worthy of 
special protection because it is seen as 
benefiting society as a whole and stimulating 




The Court described the essential features of The 
Copyright Act as under: 
„The Act seeks to maintain a balance between the 
interest of the owner of the copyright in 
protecting his works on the one hand and the 
interest of the public to have access to the works, 
on the other. The extent to which the owner is 
entitled to protection in regard to his work for 
which he has obtained copyright and the interest 
of the public is a matter which would depend 
upon the statutory provisions. Whereas the Act 
provides for exclusive rights in favor of owners of 
the copyright, there are provisions where it has 
been recognized that public has also substantial 
interest in the availability of the works.‟
54
 
The Court explained the philosophy of Copyright 
Law as under: 
„The underlying philosophy of The Copyright 
Act is that the owner of the copyright is free to 
enter into voluntary agreement or licenses on 
terms mutually acceptable to him and the 
licensee. The Act confers on the copyright owner 
the exclusive right to do the various acts 
enumerated in Section 14. An infringement of 
copyright occurs if one of those acts is done 
without the owner's license. A license passes no 
interest, but merely makes lawful that which 
would otherwise be unlawful. The Act also 
expressly recognizes the notion of an “exclusive 
license” which is defined in Section 2 (j). But 
that does not mean, as would be noticed from 
the discussions made. . . that it would apply in 
all situations irrespective of the nature of right 
as also the rights of others. It means a license 
which confers on the licensee, to the exclusion of 




all other persons (including the owner of the 
copyright) any right comprised in the copyright 
in a work. An exclusive licensee has specific 
rights under the Act such as the right to have 
recourse to civil remedies under Section 55 of 
the Act. This Scheme shows that a copyright 
owner has complete freedom to enjoy the fruits 
of his labour by earning an agreed fee or royalty 
through the issuance of licenses. Hence, the 
owner of a copyright has full freedom to enjoy 
the fruits of his work by earning an agreed fee 
or royalty through the issue of licenses. But, this 
right, to repeat, is not absolute. It is subject to 
right of others to obtain compulsory licence as 




Explaining the scheme of The Copyright Act, the 
Court observed as under: 
„The scheme of the Act affirms the freedom to 
contract as being the primary machinery by 
which the copyright owner publishes his work 
through a voluntary license regime in terms of 
Section 30. Compulsory licenses are an 
exception to the general freedom of the 
copyright owner to contract.‟
56
 
As to the question whether the concept of property 
is applicable to copyright, the Court observed as:
57
 
„An owner of a copyright indisputably has a 
right akin to the right of property. It is also a 
human right. Now, human rights have started 
gaining a multifaceted approach. Property 
rights vis-a-vis individuals are also 
incorporated within the „multiversity‟ of human 
rights. As, for example, any claim of adverse 
possession has to be read in consonance with 
human rights. The activist approach of the 
European Court of Human Rights is quite visible 
from the judgment of Beaulane Properties Ltd v 
Palmer
58
 and JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham‟.
59
 
Explaining the significance of property right, the 
Court observed as under: 
„This Court recognized need of incorporating 
the same principle for invoking the rule of strict 
construction in such matters in PT 
Munichikkanna Reddy
60
 stating “Adverse 
possession is a right which comes into play not 
just because someone loses his right to reclaim 
the property out of continuous and willful 
neglect but also on account of possessor‟s 
positive intent to dispossess. Intention to possess 
cannot be substituted for intention to dispossess. 
Mere possession for howsoever length of time 
does not result in converting the permissible 
possession into adverse possession.”
57
 
Further, in Peter Smith v Kvaerner Cementation 
Foundations Ltd,
61
 the Court allowed the appellant to 
reopen the case despite a delay of four years as he had 
been denied the right to which Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights entitled him 




Elucidating the nature of property right, the Court 
observed as under: 
„But the right of property is no longer a 
fundamental right. It will be subject to 
reasonable restrictions. In terms of Article 300A 
of the Constitution, it may be subject to the 
conditions laid down therein, namely, it may be 
wholly or in part acquired in public interest and 
on payment of reasonable compensation.‟
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As to the interface of private property and public 
interest, the Court observed as:  
„What would be a public interest? Would it 
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each 
case and the provisions of the statute? General 
meaning of the word “public policy” has always 
been held to be an unruly horse by this Court. . . 
The right to property, therefore, is not dealt with 
its subject to restrict when a right to property 
creates a monopoly to which public must have 
access. Withholding the same from public may 
amount to unfair trade practice. . .In our 
constitutional Scheme of statute monopoly is not 
encouraged. Knowledge must be allowed to be 
disseminated. An artistic work if made public 
should be made available subject of course to 
reasonable terms and grant of reasonable 
compensation to the public at large.
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The Supreme Court reiterated the opinion 
expressed in Gramophone Company of India Ltd
63 
as 
to the theoretical underpinning of copyright by 
invoking the Labour Theory. However, while citing 
from Copinger and Skone James on Copyright, the 
Court emphasized that copyright is “considered a 
social requirement in the public interest that authors 
and other rights owners should be encouraged to 
publish their work so as to permit the widest possible 
dissemination of works to the public at large.” This 




observation is based on Utilitarian Theory. The Court 
is invoking both the Labour Theory and Utilitarian 
Theories simultaneously. Still quoting from Copinger 
and Skone James on Copyright, the Court noted “To 
generalize, it is true to say that in the development of 
modern copyright laws, the economic and social 
arguments are given more weight in Anglo-American 
laws of common law tradition, whereas, in 
Continental law countries with civil law systems, the 
natural law argument and the protection of authors are 
given first place.” However, the Court did not 
explicitly identify whether the Indian law gives more 
weight to social and economic arguments or to the 
natural law argument. It appears that the Court was 
tracing the theoretical underpinnings of the copyright 
law in both the common law and Continental law 
traditions. The Court further quoted from Copinger 
and Skone James on Copyright as“The protection of 
copyright, along with other IPR, is considered as a 
form of property worthy of special protection because 
it is seen as benefiting society as a whole and 
stimulating further creative activity and competition 
in the public interest.” 
While describing the essential features of The 
Copyright Act, the Court noted that “The Act seeks to 
maintain a balance between the interest of the owner 
of the copyright in protecting his works on the one 
hand and the interest of the public to have access to 
the works, on the other.” This observation of the 
Court traces the theoretical underpinning of copyright 
law in the Utilitarian Theory. 
The Court also observed that copyright is a 
property right. Being a property right it is 
constitutional right. The Court further noted that 
copyright is a human right. Concluding the discussion 
as to the theoretical underpinnings of copyright the 
Court observed, “In our constitutional Scheme of 
statute monopoly is not encouraged. Knowledge must 
be allowed to be disseminated. An artistic work if 
made public should be made available subject of 
course to reasonable terms and grant of reasonable 
compensation to the public at large.”  
It may be said that the Supreme Court in 
Entertainment Network (India) Ltd,
49
 traced the 
theoretical underpinnings of copyright in both the 
Labour and the Utilitarian Theories. However, it 
placed the Utilitarian Theory at the highest pedestal in 
comparison to the Labour Theory. In other words, the 
Court declared that Labour Theory may justify the 
existence of copyright but it may not justify the 
exercise of copyright. In case of conflict between the 
interest of the fruit of labour and social interest the 
former must yield to and succumb to the latter. The 
justification of the copyright lies in the end of social 
purpose. In other words, the Court declared that 
copyright is a means to achieve the ends of creativity 
and dissemination of knowledge, i.e., copyright as a 
monopoly can be only tolerated to the extent it serves 
social purposes of creativity and dissemination of 
knowledge. In the light of this judgment, it may be 
said that mechanism evolved by the Court for 
minimizing the chasm between the friends and foes of 
copyright is to primacy to public interests of creativity 
and dissemination of knowledge over the monopoly in 
the name of copyright coming into existence due the 
labour of the author. 
In Eastern Book Company v DB Modak,
64
the 
judgment on behalf of the unanimous Court was 
delivered by Justice P PNaolekar.Describing the 
theoretical basis of copyright, the Supreme Court 
observed as:  
„The copyright, protection finds its justification in 
fair play. When a person produces something with 
his skill and labour, it normally belongs to him and 
the other person would not be permitted to make a 
profit but of the skill and labour of the original 
author and it is for this reason The Copyright Act 
gives to the authors certain exclusive rights in 
relation to the certain work referred in the Act. 
The object of the Act is to protect the author of the 
copyright work from an unlawful reproduction or 
exploitation of his work by others. Copyright is a 
right to stop others from exploiting the work 
without the consent or assent of the owner of the 
copyright. A Copyright Law presents a balance 
between the interests and rights of the author and 
that of the public in protecting the public domain, 
or to claim the copyright and protect it under the 
copyright statute. One of the key requirements is 
that of originality which contributes, and has a 
direct nexus, in maintaining the interests of the 
author as well as that of public in protecting the 
matters in' public domain. It is a well-accepted 
principle of copyright law that there is no 
copyright in the facts per se, as the facts are not 
created nor have they originated with the author 
 of any work which embodies these facts. The issue 
of Copyright is closely connected to that  








Tracing the development of Copyright Law, the 
Court noted that „The development of Copyright Law 
in India is closely associated with the British 
Copyright Law Statute of Anne, the first Copyright 
Act in England, was passed in 17
th 
century which 
provided that the author of any book already printed 
will have the sole right of printing such book for a 
term mentioned, therein. Thereafter, came the Act of 
1814, and then the Act of 1842, which repealed the 
two earlier Acts of 1709 and 1814. The Copyright Act 
of 1911, in England had codified and consolidated the 
various earlier Copyright Acts on different works. 
Then came The Copyright Act of 1956. In India, the 
first Copyright Act was passed in 1914. This was 
nothing but a copy of The Copyright Act of 1911, of 
United Kingdom with suitable modifications to make 
it applicable to the then British India. The Copyright 
Act of 1957, which is the current statute, has followed 
and adopted the principles and provisions contained in 
the UK Act of 1956, along with introduction of  
many new provisions. Then came The Copyright 
(Amendment) Act 1983, which made a number of 
amendments to the Act of 1957, and The Copyright 
(Amendment) Act 1984, which was mainly 
introduced with the object to discourage and prevent 
the widespread piracy prevailing in video film and 
records. Thereafter, The Copyright (Amendment) Act, 
1994, has effected many major amendments in The 
Copyright Act of 1957.‟
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As to the nature of copyright, the Court observed as 
under: 
„Copyright is purely a creation of the statute 
under the 1957 Act. What rights the author has 
in his work by virtue of his creation, are defined 
in Sections 14 and 17 of the Act. These are 
exclusive rights, but subject to the other 
provisions of the Act. In the first place, the work 
should qualify under the provisions of Section 
13, for the subsistence of copyright. Although 
the rights have been referred to as exclusive 
rights, there are various exceptions to them 
which are listed in Section 52.‟
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After discussing decisions of various Courts, the 
Court described the threshold requirement of 
copyright protection as:  
„These decisions are the authority on the 
proposition that the work that has been 
originated from an author and is more than a 
mere copy of the original work, would be 
sufficient to generate copyright. This approach 
is consistent with the “sweat of the brow” 
standards of originality. The creation of the 
work which has resulted from little bit of skill, 
labour and capital are sufficient for a copyright 
in derivative work of an author. Decisions 
propounded a theory that an author deserves to 
have his or her efforts in producing a work, 
rewarded. The work of an author need not be in 
an original form or novel form, but it should not 
be copied from another‟s work, that is, it should 
originate from the author. The originality 
requirement in derivative work is that it should 
originate from the author by application of 
substantial degree of skill, industry or 
experience. Precondition to copyright is that 
work must be produced independently and not 
copied from another person. Where a 
compilation is produced from the original work, 
the compilation is more than simply a 
rearranged copyright of original, which is often 
referred to as skill, judgment and or labour or 
Capital. The copyright has nothing to do with 
originality or literary merit. Copyrighted 
material is that what is created by the author by 
his skill, labour and investment of capital, 
maybe it is derivative work. The courts have 
only to evaluate whether derivative work is not 
the end-product of skill, labour and capital 
which is trivial or negligible but substantial. The 
courts need not go into evaluation of literary 






 the Supreme Court emphasized 
that “The Copyright Protection finds its justification 
in fair play.” The fair play between the person who 
produces something with his skill and labour, on the 
one hand and public interest. The fair play requires 
that the produce should normally belong to the 
producer and the other person should not be permitted 
to make a profit out of the produce of the skill and 
labour of the original author. The fair play further 
requires the copyright law to present a balance 
between the interests and rights of the author and that 
of the public in protecting the public domain, or to 
claim the copyright and protect it under the copyright 
statute. Describing the requirement of originality as 
the key requirement contributing and having a direct 
nexus, in maintaining the interests of the author as 
well as that of public in protecting the matters in 
public domain. Elaborating the requirement of 




originality, the Court note that, “It is a well-accepted 
principle of copyright law that there is no copyright in 
the facts per se, as the facts are not created nor have, 
they originated with the author of any work which 
embodies these facts.” The Court also emphasized the 
connection between copyright with commercial viability 
and commercial consequences and implications. 
In DB Modak,
64 
the Supreme Court invoked both 
the Labour and Utilitarian Theories. In the opinion of 
the Court the chasm between the friends and foes of 
copyright can be minimized by a fair balancing of the 
interest of the author and that of the public by 
protecting public domain. However, the Court did not 
make a distinction between the interest of the author 
and the interest of the owner of copyright for in most 
of the cases the balancing is required to be done 
between the interest of the owner of the copyright and 
that of the public. What justifies ownership in 
copyright where the owner of the copyright is a 
person other than the author of the work. Whether it is 
the money, investment and capital that justifies 
copyright in such cases? 
In Dabur India Ltd v KR Industries,
68
Academy of 
General Education, Manipalv B Malini 
Mallya,
69
Phonographic Performance Ltd v 
Entertainment Network (India) Ltd
70 
and Paragon 
Rubber Industries  v Pragathi Rubber Mills,
71 
the 
Supreme Court did not discuss or expressed any 
opinionas to the theoretical underpinnings of 
copyright. 
In KrishkaLulla v ShyamVithalrao Devkatta,
72
 the 
Supreme Court observed as: 
„[N]o copyright subsists in the title of a literary 
work and a plaintiff or a complainant is not 
entitled to relief on such basis except in an 
action for passing off or in respect of a 
registered trademark comprising such titles. 
This does not mean that in no case can a title be 
a proper subject of protection against being 
copied as held in Dicks v Yates
73
 where Jessel 
MR said “there might be copyright in a title as 
for instance a whole page of title or something 






 the Supreme Court reiterated 
the point that copyright protection can only be 
extended to „work‟ in the copyright law sense. In 
other words, the person must put in some labour, 
some skill, some judgment to claim copyright 
protection. The Court seems to have invoked the 
Labour Theory for copyright protection. In most of 
the cases, the Court invoked the Labour Theory for 
copyright protection. In some of the decisions, both 
the Labour Theory and Utilitarian Theory have been 
invoked by the Supreme Court. 
No decision of the Supreme Court identified the 
real rub of the problem, i.e., people do not criticize 
copyright because it protects the interest of the  
author. Foes of copyright claim that the fruit of the 
labour, skill and judgment of the author is 
appropriated by the employer, by the business houses, 
by the government. What justifies this appropriation? 
Can this appropriation be called a fair play? We need 
a theory which can justify or demolish or at least may 
construct a middle path which brings the ownership 
(not authorship) of copyright at the center 
stage.Following seeks to examine theoretical 
underpinnings of copyright under The Designs Act, 
2000. 
 
Copyright under The Designs Act, 2000: 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
Only one decision of the Supreme Court deals with 
the theoretical underpinnings of copyright under The 
Designs Act, 2000 (Designs Act). 
In Bharat Glass Tube LtdvGopal Glass Works 
Ltd,
76
 the decision on behalf of the unanimous Court 
was delivered by Justice A K Mathur. The Court 
reproduced the Statement of Objects and Reasons of 
Bill introduced for the enactment of The Designs 
Actwhich reads as „Since the enactment of The 
Designs Act, 1911, considerable progress has been 
made in the field of science and technology. The legal 
system of the protection of industrial designs requires 
to be made more efficient in order to ensure effective 
protection to registered designs. It is also required to 
promote design activity in order to promote the design 
element in an article of production. The proposed 
Design Bill is essentially aimed to balance these 
interests. It is also intended to ensure that the law does 
not unnecessarily extent protection beyond what is 
necessary to create the required incentive for design 




Explaining the purpose of The Designs Act, the 
Court observed as: 
„In fact, the sole purpose of this Act is protection of 
the IPR of the original design for a period of ten years 
or whatever further period extendable. The object 
behind this enactment is to benefit the person for his 
research and labour put in by him to evolve the new 




and original design. This is the sole aim of enacting 
this Act (emphasis added). 
It has also laid down that if design is not new or 
original or published previously then such design 
should not be registered. It further lays down that if it 
has been disclosed to the public anywhere in India or 
in any other country by publication in tangible form 
or by use or in any other way prior to the filing date, 
or where applicable, the priority date of the 
application for registration then such design will not 
be registered or if it is found that it is not significantly 
distinguishable from known designs or combination 
of known designs, then such designs shall not be 
registered. It also provides that registration can be 
cancelled under Section 19 of The Designs Act if 
proper application is filed before the competent 
authority i.e., the Controller that the design has been 
previously registered in India or published in India or 
in any other country prior to the date of registration, 
or that the design is not a new or original design or 
that the design is not registerable under this Act or 
that it is not a design as defined in Clause (d) of 
Section 2. The Controller after hearing both the 
parties if satisfied that the design is not new or 
original or that it has already been registered or if it is 
not registerable, cancel such registration and 
aggrieved against that order, appeal shall lie to the 
High Court. These prohibitions have been engrafted 
so as to protect the original person who has designed 
a new one by virtue of his own efforts by researching 
for a long time (emphasis added). The new and 
original design when registered is for a period of ten 
years. Such original design which is new and which 
has not been available in the country or has not been 
previously registered or has not been published in 
India or in any other country prior to the date of 
registration shall be protected for a period of ten 
years. Therefore, it is in the nature of protection of the 
IPR. This was the purpose as is evident from the 
statement of objects and reasons and from various 
provisions of the Act.‟
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The Court also quoted from a book
79
 as under: 
„Object of registration of designs. The protection 
given by the law relating to designs to those who 
produce new and original designs, is primarily to 




Explaining the reason of copyright under The 
Designs Act, the Court observed as: 
„Those who wish to purchase an article for use 
are often influenced in their choice not only by 
practical efficiency but the appearance. 
Common experience shows that not all are 
influenced in the same way. Some look for 
artistic merit. Some are attracted by a design 
which is a stranger or bizarre. Many simply 
choose the article which catches their eye. 
Whatever the reason may be one article with a 
particular design may sell better than one 
without it: then it is profitable to use the design. 
And much thought, time and expense may have 
been incurred in finding a design which will 
increase sales. The object of design registration 
is to see that the originator of a profitable 
design is not deprived of his reward by others 
applying it to their goods‟.
80
(emphasis added) 
Explaining the purpose of The Designs Act, the 
Court observed as: 
„The purpose of The Designs Act is to protect 
novel designs devised to be applied to (or in 
other words, to govern the shape and 
configuration of) particular articles to be 
manufactured and marketed commercially. It is 
not to protect principles of operation or 
invention which, if profitable at all, ought to be 
made the subject-matter of a patent. Nor is it to 
prevent the copying of the direct product of 
original artistic effort in producing a drawing. 
Indeed, the whole purpose of a design is that it 
shall not stand on its own as an artistic work  
but shall be copied by embodiment in a 
commercially produced artefact. Thus, the 
primary concern, is what the finished article is 
to look like and not with what it does and the 
monopoly provided for the proprietor is effected 
by according not, as in the case of ordinary 
copyright, a right to prevent direct reproduction 
of the image registered as the design but the 
right, over a much more limited period, to 
prevent the manufacture and sale of article of a 
design not substantially different from the 
registered design. The emphasis therefore is 




The Court in Bharat Glass Tube Ltd,
76
 recognized 
the following justifications of copyright under The 
Designs Act, namely: 




(i) The object behind this enactment is to benefit the 
person for his research and labour put in by him 
to evolve the new and original design. This is the 
sole aim of enacting this Act; and 
(ii) The protection given by the law relating to 
designs to those who produce new and original 
designs, is primarily to advance industries, and 
keep them at a high level of competitive progress. 
The first justification (a) reiterates the Natural 
Right justification of copyright under The Designs 
Act and second justification (b) bases the justification 
in both Natural Right Theory and Utilitarian Theory 
for the emphasis in this approach is that protection of 
design is a means to achieve the ends of advancement 
of industries and keep them at a high level of 
competitive progress. 
In Godrej Sara Lee Ltd v Reckitt Benckiser 
Australia Ltd,
81
 Justice AltamasKabir delivered the 
unanimous opinion on behalf of the Court. No opinion 
as to the theoretical underpinnings of Design Law was 
expressed in this case. 
Though, only two decisions of the Supreme Court 
are available on Design Law and only in one of the 
decisions, the Court explained the theoretical basis of 
Design Law, yet the Court articulated the reasons very 
clearly. The first object that the Court identified is to 
encourage creative minds to come up with new 
designs by putting in their labour and research. The 
Court called it the “sole aim” of The Designs Act. The 
Court, however, did not stop and proceeded to 
observe that creation of “new and original design” is 
not an end by and itself rather than the protection of 
such designs is “primarily to advance industries” and 
“keep them at a high level of competitive progress.” 
In other words, the labour put in by the producer of 
new and original design promotes the advancement of 




An analysis of the decisions of the Supreme Court 
reveals that in no case relating to two copyrights the 
constitutional validity of these statutory copyrights 
was challenged. In a sense, therefore, there was no 
need to engage in philosophical discourse. Be that as 
it may, once the Court was engaged in such a 
discourse, it was expected that the Court would apply 
judicial standards to rigorously scrutinize theoretical 
underpinning of two copyrights from all possible 
angles. It was also expected that names of theoretical 
frameworks with the names of their proponents 
should have been referred. Nonetheless, the idea 
underlying these two theoretical frameworks is very 
much present in the decisions of the Supreme Court.  
Initially the Supreme Court invoked only Labour 
Theory to justify „why‟ of copyright under The 
Copyright Act but later on the Court employed both 
the natural right and utilitarian justifications for 
copyright. The Court completely ignored the inherent 
distinction between the two theoretical frameworks. 
The Court did not refer to Bentham‟s description of 
Labour Theory as „nonsense on stilts‟.
82
 The Court 
nowhere referred to John Locke‟s criticism of 
copyright.
83
 The Court also did not notice the inherent 
distinction between the „intangible‟ subject matter of 
two copyrights and „tangible‟ subject matter of private 
property for which these theoretical frameworks were 
constructed. Mechanical application of these 
theoretical frameworks could have been avoided and 
judicial standards of fairness and reasonableness 
should have been used to construct a sound and 
objective justification as to „why‟ of two copyrights. 
In the opinions of the Supreme Court, the author 
deserves a copyright for he puts in his labour, skill, 
judgment, and capital and therefore the fruit of his 
labour must belong to him. However, this requirement 
of labour, skill, judgment, and capital has been 
modified in DB Modak,
84 
in cases of reporting of 
judgments of Courts, as skill and judgment. 
Nevertheless, the idea of applying intellectual labour is 
central to copyright justification. The Court also 
recognized that protection of copyright also serves 
social purpose. The Supreme Court is of the opinion 
that copyright protection finds its justification in fair 
play. The object of The Copyright Act is to protect the 
author of the copyright work from an unlawful 
reproduction or exploitation of his work by others. A 
copyright law presents a balance between the interests 
and rights of the author and that of the public in 
protecting the public domain, or to claim the copyright 
and protect it under the copyright statute. One of the 
key requirements is that of originality which 
contributes, and has a direct nexus, in maintaining the 
interests of the author as well as that of public in 
protecting the matters in public domain. The Court also 
emphasized the significance of copyright in terms of 
revenue to the State. The black or grey marketing of 
copyrighted materials has been identified as one of the 
reasons of criminalizing copyright infringements. This 
is clearly a utilitarian justification. 




An analysis of cases relating to copyright under 
The Designs Act reveals that: (i) the object behind 
The Designs Act is to benefit the person for his 
research and labour put in by him to evolve the new 
and original design. This is the sole aim of enacting 
theDesigns Act, and (ii) the protection given by the 
law relating to designs to those who produce new and 
original designs, is primarily to advance industries, 
and keep them at a high level of competitive progress. 
The first justification reiterates the Labour Theory 
justification of copyright under The Designs Act and 
second justification bases the justification in both 
Labour Theory and Utilitarian Theory for the 
emphasis in this approach is that protection of design 
is a means to achieve the ends of advancement of 
industries and keep them at a high level of 
competitive progress. 
It may be concluded that the Court seems to have 
used both the theoretical frameworks as supplementary 
and complimentary to each other. Later judgments of 
the Court lay primary emphasis on Utilitarian Theory 
to justify the two copyrights. In the later judgments, 
Labour Theory has been assigned the supporting role to 
the Utilitarian Theory. The Supreme Court has not said 
that only because someone has come up with an IP 
therefore, he is entitled to exclude others from making 
and using it. Current approach of the Supreme Court to 
two copyrights may be described as utilitarian.Since 
this is an analytical study, no suggestion is offered as to 
the reform in the law. However, it is suggested that 
since the extant theoretical frameworks are wanting as 
they do not factor the problem of appropriation of fruit 
of labour of the author or inventor by the big or small 
corporate or business houses. The extant theoretical 
frameworks, therefore, cannot provide a convincing 
explanation for the vices of IP. Since IP is a species of 
property and shares only attribute of right to exclude 
others, the wholesale import and mechanical extension 
of theoretical frameworks of property rights in 
tangibles cannot fully explain the nuances of IP in 
intangibles. Hence, there is a need to construct a theory 
of IPwhich can provide a reasonableand convincing 
explanation making out a strong case for a fair and 
equitable regime of IP in general and the two 
copyrights in particular. 
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